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ANALYSIS OF COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT OF
DIGITAL RECORDINGS
Sara Steetle*
I. INTRODUCTION
The advent of the Internet and digital distribution of music has
revolutionized the methods for copying music. Unlike previous
technologies, digital music files' can be copied indefinitely with no decay
in sound quality2 and disseminated around the world via the Internet.3 Not
surprisingly, such advances have engendered significant controversy.4 The
Recording Industry Association of America ("RIAA") has filed suit against
B.A., New College of the University of South Florida, 1997; J.D., Georgetown University Law
Center, 2000. The author would like to thank her parents and Professor Julie Cohen for their
advice and guidance on this paper.
1. Virtually all recording technology takes either analog or digital form. Lycos Tech
Glossary: Analog, at http://webopedia.lycos.com/TERM/a/analog.html (last visited Nov. 6,
2000).
2. The primary feature of analog representations is they are continuous, as opposed to digital
representations, which measure values at discrete intervals. Id. Furthermore, "with analog
recording, each successive generation of copies suffers from an increasingly pronounced
degradation of sound quality." Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys.,
Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1073 (9th Cir. 1999). "[W]hen an analog cassette copy of a record or
compact disc is itself copied by analog technology, the resulting 'second generation' copy of the
original will most likely suffer from the hiss and lack of clarity characteristic of older
recordings." Id. In contrast, digital copying permits "thousands of perfect or near perfect copies
(and copies of copies) to be made from a single original recording." Id.
3. Diamond, 180 F.3d at 1073-74.
4. Ann Donahue, Cold War Summit, VARIETY, June 19-June 25, 2000, at 16 (discussing the
San Diego MP3 Summit and concluding tensions are likely to explode as a result of the
controversy surrounding MP3 technology); Jeffery Goodell, World War MP3, ROLLING STONE,
July 8-22, 1999, at 43; Matt Richtel, News Watch; From Poetry to Newspapers, MP3 Fare for
the Literary Set, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1999, at G3 (explaining the MP3 format generates
controversy due to its lack of encryption); Robert Thomason & Rob Pegoraro, MP3.com License
to Play Copyrighted Tunes, WASH. POST, June 17, 1999, at COI (explaining "MP3.com has been
the focus of... controversy over the protection of the rights of musicians and record labels who
assert that free MP3 files on the Internet encourage piracy of copyrighted material).
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companies offering music on the Interet, 5 and the International Federation
of the Phonographic Industry ("IFPI") has worked worldwide to shut down
online music distributors.6 Despite the RIAA's attempts to educate people
that this conduct could constitute copyright infringement, 7 the interest in
8music trading continues to grow.
In response to this increasing problem, on January 21, 2000,
Universal Music Group, EMI, Warner Brothers, BMG and Sony, under the
umbrella of the RIAA, filed suit against MP3.com 9 for violating the right of
reproduction in the sound recordings held by producers through its
5. Diamond, 180 F.3d 1072; UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349
(S.D.N.Y. 2000); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1781, available at
No. C 99-5183, No. C 00-0074, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11862 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000).
6. 1FPI is the organization representing the international recording industry. Internet
Settlement in China Leads to Joint IFP/My Web Copyright Campaign, BuS. WIRE, Mar. 24,
2000, LEXIS, News Group File, All. Its membership consists of 1400 record producers and
distributors in 76 countries. Id. Its mission is "to fight music piracy, promote fair market access
and adequate copyright laws, help develop the legal conditions for the music industry to prosper
in the digital era, and promote the value of music in the development of economics." Id. The
IFPI is currently taking action to tackle online music pirates in at least twenty countries. Sylvia
Dennis, Global Music Industry Fights Back Against Net Piracy, NEWSBYTES, Oct. 28, 1999; see
Chris Oakes, Stamping Out Pirated Tunes, WIRED NEWS, Jan. 29, 2000, at
http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,33940,33.html ("[C]opyright Control Services, an
organization in England, documents and closes down Internet sites and communications channels
containing illegal MP3 files, and is now advising the IFPI to mirror their efforts.").
7. Soundbyting Start: Education Is the Key to Answering Complex Internet Questions, at
http://www.soundbyting.com (last visited Nov. 2, 2000) (The RIAA has launched a
"Soundbyting" campaign at the university level to raise awareness that reproducing and
distributing music via the Internet illegally is "akin to stealing"); Recording Industry Association
of America/Anti-Piracy: Introduction, at http://www.riaa.com/Protect-Online-1.cfm (last visited
Nov. 2, 2000) (stating downloading music from the Internet is illegal); Recording Industry
Association ofAmerica/Anti-Piracy: What Is Piracy?, at http://www.riaa.com/Protect-Campaign-
1.cfm (last visited Nov. 2, 2000) (defining piracy as the "illegal duplication and distribution of
sound recordings" and explaining the forms it takes); Recording Industry Association of
America/Music & The Internet: Downloading & Uploading, at http://www.riaa,.com/Music-
Rules-2.cfm (last visited Nov. 2, 2000) (discussing the background of copyright law and why
copyrights are infringed in songs online); Recording Industry Association of America/Music &
The Internet: Downloading & Uploading FAQ, at http://www.riaa.com/Music-Rules-2-FAQ.cfm
(last visited Nov. 2, 2000) (answering the most frequently asked questions regarding distribution
via the Internet, copyright issues and penalties).
8. See Complaint, 1, 15, MPL Communications, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. filed on
Mar. 21, 2000) (No. 00 CIV. 1979), available at http://www.mp3.com/news/672.html.
MP3.com's library contains over 80,000 CDs, and is growing at the rate of 1500 CDs a day. Id.;
see Greg Miller & P.J. Huffstutter, File-Sharing PC Software Shakes Up Music World, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 24, 2000, at A 12 (noting the "explosive growth" of the use of the "Napster" MP3 file
trading program).
9. http://www.mp3.com (last visited Oct. 21, 2000); see generally MP3.com: Welcome New
Users!, at http://help.mp3.com/help (last visited Oct. 21, 2000) (defining MP3.com as a music
service provider offering new ways for music fans to "discover, manage and listen to their music
collection").
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My.MP3.com service.10 MP3.com presented several affirmative defenses
that were ultimately struck down by the court.1 Four months later in a four
page opinion, partial summary judgment was granted in favor of the RIAA
in UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc. 12
This Article provides a deeper analysis of the potential copyright
liability of MP3.com for their My.MP3.com service. Additionally, it offers
a foundation on which policymakers can stand when facing this complex
issue, both in the appeals process and in similar cases. Part II introduces
the mp3 13 technology and gives a brief background of MP3.com and its
My.MP3.com service. Part III discusses UMG Recordings and critiques
the court's decision. Part IV presents an overview of copyright
infringement law. Part V explores the fair use exception as well as
additional theories of liability against MP3.com based on contributory and
vicarious infringement of copyright through its My.MP3.com service. It
also addresses the potential implications of the Audio Home Recording Act
("AHRA"). Part VI analyzes the ways in which the My.MP3.com service
may infringe on the reproduction right, and similarly, Part VII considers
how- My.MP3.com may infringe the distribution right. Part VIII examines
ways in which My.MP3.com may infringe the digital performance right in
sound recordings granted by the Copyright Act. Finally, Part IX concludes
10. My.MP3.com is a service advertised as "permitting subscribers to store, customize, and
listen to the recordings contained on their CDs from any place where they have an Internet
connection." UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
11. See 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (rejecting the defense of fair use as well as those of copyright
misuse, abandonment, unclean hands and estoppel).
12. Id. at 353. Since the grant of summary judgement, MP3.com settled for an undisclosed
amount with four of the five individual record labels (EMI, Warner Music, BMG, and Sony
Music) that, combined under the RIAA, filed suit against MP3.com. Brad King, MP3.com: Four
Down, One to Go, WIRED NEWS (Aug. 21, 2000), available at
wysiwyg://68http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,38352,00.html. On September 6,
2000, Judge Rakoff ordered MP3.com to pay to the fifth label, Universal Music Group, damages
of $25,000 per compact disc copied. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 472,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13293, *18 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2000). Since the damages decision,
MP3.com settled with Universal for $53.4 million and plans to restart the My.MP3.com service.
My.MP3.com Reborn, for a Price, WIRED NEWS (Nov. 15, 2000), available at
wysiwyg://25/http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,40196,00.html (last visited Nov. 16,
2000).
13. MP3 is a digital audio compression algorithm that makes an audio file "smaller" by
limiting the audio bandwidth, thus allowing the quicker transference and more efficient storage of
digital audio files. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d
1072, 1074 (9th Cir. 1999); see Chas J. Hartman & Edward Stubenrauch, I Want My MP3: New
Technology Sparks Debate, THE POST (Ohio University; Athens, Ohio), May 27, 1999 at
http://thepost.laker.ohiou.edu/archives2/052799/access01.html. MP3 stands for Moving Pictures
Experts Group Audio-I Layer 3. Id.
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that MP3.com infringes upon certain rights granted by the Copyright Act
and offers an afterthought on music file sharing programs.
II. MP3 TECHNOLOGY AND MY.MP3.COM
MP3 is the most popular form of downloading digital audio files from
the Internet. 14 The mp3 file format compresses data to a greater extent than
previous file compressing technologies, allowing for more efficient storage
and faster download times.15 Users make mp3 files and swap them over the
Internet via e-mail, newsgroups, chat rooms, or other programs specially
developed for mp3 trading.'
6
MP3.com is a popular source of these files. 17 Generally, MP3.com
allows its members access to mp3 files donated by members who have
composed and performed the music themselves; thus, MP3.com does not
infringe these copyrights. However, UMG Recordings confirms that
My.MP3.com, a service offered by MP3.com, presents copyright problems
due to the availability of copyrighted materials it provides.' 
8
My.MP3.com differs from MP3.com's basic service in that the mp3
files available through My.MP3.com were placed there by MP3.com, rather
than by the composers of the music or by the music's current copyright
holder. MP3.com produces the digital files from prerecorded, store-bought
14. Diamond, 180 F.3d at 1074; see Chris Oakes, 'Save Our Napster, ' Say Students, WIRED
NEWS (Feb. 17, 2000), at http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,34382,00.html (stating MP3
file trading programs account for a significant amount of university network traffic. At Bucknell
University and Indiana University, MP3 file trading programs account for forty percent and sixty-
one percent of network traffic respectively).
15. Diamond,180 F.3d at 1073-74 (stating "until recently, the Internet was of little use for
the distribution of music because the average music computer file was simply too big: the digital
information on a single compact disc of music required hundreds of computer floppy discs to
store, and downloading even a single song from the Internet took hours"); see supra note 13 and
accompanying text.
16. A&M Records v. Napster, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1781, 1783 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000),
available at No. C 99-5183, No. C 00-0074, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11862, at *6 (explaining the
two ways users typically acquire MP3 files: 1) downloading audio recordings previously
converted into MP3 format through a service such as Napster; and 2) utilizing "ripping" software,
which makes it possible to copy a CD directly onto a computer hard drive by compressing the
information on a CD into a smaller MP3 file requiring a fraction of the storage space).
17. The Motley Fool's Company Snapshot: MP3.com, Inc., Fool.com (Oct. 20, 2000), at
http://quote.fool.com/snapshot/snapshot.asp?symbols=MPPP; see also Fool Interview with
Michael Robertson, CEO of MP3.com: Part 1, Fool.com (May 23, 2000) at
http://www.fool.com/specials/2000/sp000523a.htm.
18. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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copies of sound recordings. 19 The musician, producer, or other copyright
holder may never know the copyrighted work is put to such use. Users
with access to the mp3 files can listen to them via any Internet connection;
they need only enter their name and password at the My.MP3.com site.2 °
To gain access, MP3.com members verify with MP3.com that they
own a copy of the music. 21  Owners of copies may use Beam-ItTM, a
program provided by MP3.com, to complete this step. 22 Beam-ItTM lets
users place a physical copy of the compact disc ("CD") into the computer's
CD drive; it then transports the identifying information on the CD to
MP3.com. 23 It is essential to note that with Beam-ItTM, a copy of the music
is never transported; only the information needed by My.MP3.com to
match it to a CD already in its library is taken. My.MP3.com can grant
access to a certain sound recording only if that recording is already in its
library.24
Alternatively, if the user does not own a copy of the music, the user
may purchase the CD online through MP3.com's online partners.25  The
member is then permitted to listen to the mp3 files even before the physical
CD arrives in the mail.26
Once MP3.com confirms a member has purchased the music, the
company gives that member access to that music from the My.MP3.com
library.27 The data is transferred over the Internet via "streaming," a
technique that allows information to flow through the Internet to the user's
computer without saving it as a mp3 file on the user's hard drive. 28 The
music is played on the user's computer with the aid of any number of
19. See Mark Lewis, LiveDaily Interview: Michael Robertson, CEO Of MP3.com, (Feb. 9,
2000), at wysiwyg://28/http://Iivedaily.com/news/804.html (quoting Michael Robertson's
statement that his company purchased the CDs that compose MP3.com's archive).
20. Fool Interview with Michael Robertson, CEO of MP3.com: Part 1, Fool.corn (May 23,
2000) at http://www.fool.com/specials/2000/spOO0523a.htm.
21. See Michael Robertson, My.MP3.com Q & A, MP3.com News (Jan. 24, 2000) at
http://www.mp3.com/news/534.html [hereinafter Robertson, My.MP3.com Q & A].
22. Id.
23. See id.
24. See Complaint, 1 1, MPL Communications, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. filed on
Mar. 21, 2000) (No. 00 CIV 1979), available at http://www.mp3.com/news/672.html (stating
My.MP3.com adds 1500 CDs a day to its library of over 80,000 CDs).
25. See Robertson, My.MP3.com Q & A, supra note 21.
26. See id. In the case of purchase from an online retailer, users may listen to the music
immediately from their My.MP3.com accounts. Id.
27. See id.
28. See id. Streaming technology merely plays the music and does not save a copy of the
file on a user's hard drive. Id.
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sound programs.2 9 While the user listens, and afterward, the original mp3
file remains on MP3.com's server for other members to use.3
III. UMG RECORDINGS, INC. V. MP3.COM, INC.
3 1
On April 28, 2000, Judge Rakoff of the United States District Court,
Southern District of New York, granted partial summary judgment against
MP3.com in UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc.32 Judge Rakoff held
that MP3.com's conduct in creating its My.MP3.com service was not fair
use of the copyrighted music. 33 In a short opinion, the court applied an
analysis of the fair use factors and found MP3.com liable for direct
copyright infringement of the reproduction right.34 The court stated putting
music in the mp3 format and making it accessible via the Internet is no
more a transformative use of the copyrighted work than is the
retransmission of radio broadcasts over telephone lines.35 It concluded
MP3.com's contention that it was providing a service "pirates', 36 would
otherwise perform because of consumer demand was not legally
justifiable.37 The court also found MP3.com failed to present evidence to
support its affirmative defenses.
38
The original complaint charged MP3.com with violating the right of
reproduction in the sound recordings held by the albums' producers.39
MP3.com claimed insulation from liability because it required its users to
present ownership of a physical copy of the music before gaining access to
29. Examples of such programs are RealPlayer, Liquid Audio, and Lycos Music Player.
30. See Nancy A. Bloom, Protecting Copyright Owners of Digital Music-No More Free
Access to Cyber Tunes, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 179, 185-86 (1997).
31. 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 352-53.
34. Id. at 350-54. See infra Part V.B.2 for a detailed discussion of "fair use."
35. Id. at 351 (citing Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 1998)
(rejecting the fair use defense by an operator of a service that retransmitted copyrighted radio
broadcasts over telephone lines); L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int'l Ltd., 149 F.3d 987,
994 (9th Cir. 1998) (rejecting the fair use defense where television news agencies copied
copyrighted news footage and retransmitted it to news organizations)).
36. "Pirates" are those who "use digital recording technologies to make and to distribute
near perfect copies of commercially prepared recordings for which they have not licensed the
copyrights." Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d. 1072, 1073
(9th Cir. 1999).
37. UMG Recordings, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 352.
38. See id. at 352-53.
39. Complaint, 1, UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. filed on Jan. 21,
2000) (No. 00 Civ. 0472), available at http://MP3.com/news/533.html.
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the files available through the My.MP3.com service.40 However, in reality,
this requirement is easily circumvented by borrowing another's CD.4 1
MP3.com contends that while it cannot prevent such unauthorized use of its
service, it does attempt to limit the number of people with access to its mp3
files by requiring each user to have a unique username and password.42 But
this requirement is also easily evaded. MP3.com members can disseminate
their passwords, thus allowing friends who have never even seen a copy of
the sound recording to access MP3.com's files.
Furthermore, the court's opinion ignores the natural comparison both
sides draw between mp3 file trading programs and videocassette
recorders.43 It also fails to explain the decision's implications for home
copying. 44 Perhaps Judge Rakoff believed it was premature to take a stand
on the law and policy regarding mp3 file exchanges, and was simply
attempting to contain the explosion of mp3 trading without conducting the
deep analysis the issue requires. But this issue is larger than a four-page
opinion. It is forcing the law to confront the beliefs the average person
holds about the use of intellectual property, and it may require the law to
adapt to the technology that has given "sharing" new meaning. In any
event, the debate surrounding mp3 trading is just beginning.
IV. COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
There are three fundamental forms of copyright liability: direct
infringement, contributory infringement, and vicarious liability.45
In order to establish direct copyright infringement, the plaintiff must
show both ownership of a valid copyright and "copying" by an
46unauthorized party. Copying can mean reproduction, distribution,
40. Robertson, My.MP3.com Q & A, supra note 21.
41. Id. (stating this may be "technically possible").
42. Complaint, 1, UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. filed on Jan. 21,
2000) (No. 00 Civ. 0472), available at http://MP3.com/news/533.html; Robertson, My.MP3.com
Q & A, supra note 21 (explaining all accounts are password protected so the music in one account
is not available to another account, and further asserting if MP3.com detects multiple users on the
same account, they reserve the option to terminate the account entirely).
43. See discussion infra Part V.A.2.
44. See discussion infra Part V.A.3.
45. Feist Publ'g, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991); Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 457 (C.D. Cal. 1979); 3 MELVILLE
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.04[A], at 12-67 (2000) [hereinafter
NIMMER & NIMMER].
46. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1162
(9th Cir. 1977); Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1976); see
also 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 45, § 13.01, at 13-5 & nn. 1-5 (2000).
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performance, or other uses of the original. Ownership of copyright gives
the owner control over these and most other uses of the work that may have
commercial value.47 When an unauthorized party uses the work in one of
these ways, that party has directly infringed the copyright.
In each recorded piece of music there are two copyrightable works:
the sound recording,48 and the underlying musical composition.49  The
bundle of rights associated with copyright in an underlying musical
composition include the right to reproduce the work in copies or
phonorecords, the right to prepare derivative works, the right to distribute
copies or phonorecords to the public by sale, rental, lease, or lending, the
right to perform the work publicly, the right to display the work publicly,
and the right to perform a sound recording "publicly by means of a digital
audio transmission." 50 In contrast, the rights of a copyright holder in a
sound recording are limited to the right of reproduction, the right to prepare
derivative works, the right to distribute, and the right to perform a sound
recording publicly through digital audio transmission. 51 Because mp3 files
are generally musical works, both sorts of copyright owners are interested
parties. However, the analysis of each particular right is the same. This
Article addresses violations of particular rights, rather than determining the
respective liability of a violator toward each type of copyright holder.
Contributory infringement and vicarious liability differ from direct
infringement in that both are forms of third-party liability requiring a
predicate infringing act.5 2 To prove contributory infringement, the plaintiff
must demonstrate the "defendant, with knowledge of the infringing
activity, induces, causes, or materially contributes to the infringing conduct
of another." 53  The defendant's participation must be substantial.
54
47. 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (Supp. IV 1999); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552,
1555 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
48. 17 U.S.C. § 402(b)(1) (1994); ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT:
CASES AND MATERIALS 501 (5th ed. 1999).
49. 17 U.S.C. § 401(b)(1) (1994); GORMAN & GINSBURG, supra note 48.
50. 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (Supp. IV 1999). These rights are limited by §§ 107-117 of the
Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-17 (1994).
51. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
52. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 (9th Cir.
1984); Marobie-FL, Inc. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Fire Equip. Distribs. & Northwest Nexus, Inc., 983 F.
Supp. 1167, 1178-79 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
53. Sony, 464 U.S. at 487 (citing Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc.,
443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971) (stating the court has "no quarrel" with the general statement
of the Second Circuit regarding what constitutes a finding of contributory infringement)).
54. Id.
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Whereas strict liability governs direct copyright infringement, 55 a judgment
of contributory infringement requires knowledge of the activity.
56
Vicarious liability constitutes the third fundamental form of copyright
infringement. To be vicariously liable, the defendant must have the right
and ability to supervise the infringing activity, as well as a direct financial
interest in such activities.57 While there is no requirement the defendant
have actual knowledge of the infringement, 58 the Supreme Court has stated
that it may impose vicarious liability based upon constructive knowledge.59
V. THIRD PARTY LIABILITY
A. Predicate Act
Contributory infringement and vicarious liability address third party
liability for copyright infringement claims.60 Both require a predicate act
of direct infringement, meaning that another party has already infringed,
thus giving rise to third party liability. 6' Proving the existence of a
predicate act in the context of mp3 files is easier said than done. Three
obstacles hinder proof of an individual MP3.com user's infringement: 1)
determining whether a "copy" under the Copyright Act is created in the use
of My.MP3.com's MP3 files; 2) whether such a copy is infringing; and 3)
whether the users or MP3.com are violating the Audio Home Recording
Act.
62
55. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 45, § 13.08, at 13-280 ((stating the innocent
intent of the defendant may bear on remedies but not on liability) (citing L.A. News Serv. v.
Conus Communications Co., 969 F. Supp. 579, 584 (C.D. Cal. 1997)) (a defendant's innocent
intent will not constitute a defense to a finding of liability) and Broad. Music, Inc. v. 84-88
Broadway, Inc., 942 F. Supp. 225, 230-31 (D.N.J. 1996)).
56. Marobie-FL, 983 F. Supp. at 1178.
57. Gershwin Publ'g., 443 F.2d at 1162.
58. Sony, 464 U.S. at 439.
59. Id. But see Marobie-FL, Inc., 983 F. Supp. at 1179; Playboy Enters., Inc., v. Webworld,
Inc., 991 F. Supp. 543, 553-54 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (citing Peer Int'l Corp. v. Luna Records, Inc.,
887 F. Supp. 560, 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (listing the two elements of vicarious liability and stating
knowledge is not a requirement)); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication
Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1377 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (listing the two elements of vicarious
liability and stating knowledge is not a requirement).
60. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 435; see also Marobie-FL, 983 F. Supp. at 1178-79.
61. Marobie-FL, 983 F. Supp. at 1178-79.
62. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-10 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
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1. Is a Copy Made by the User?
Works in digital form are considered "copies" under the Copyright
Act.63 Thus, while MP3.com's files are, in fact, copies, third party liability
is determined by examining the end user's actions. 64 If My.MP3.com
allowed its members to download mp3 files, the case would be easy; the
mp3 file saved to the user's computer would constitute a copy. However,
the My.MP3.com service is designed for the user to listen to the file
through streaming technology.65 Streaming technology plays the music as
the data is fed to the user's computer, but the user cannot save the file.66
Although the file is not saved for later use, when a user requests
MP3.com to stream music through the Internet, a temporary copy of the
music is made in the Random Access Memory ("RAM") of the user's
computer.67 Courts agree the transient copy created in the computer's
RAM satisfies the definition of "copy" (or "phonorecord").68 However, §
117 of the Copyright Act provides an exception to this rule. 69 To qualify
under the exception, a person must: 1) create a RAM copy as an "essential
step" in the use of the work on a machine; 2) create it only for that purpose
and only for internal use; and 3) rightfully own a copy of the work. 0
In MP3.com's case, because it attempts to limit use of its mp3 files to
those who own a copy of the work,7' it seems unlikely these RAM copies
constitute infringement. If the statute intended for the user to make the
RAM copy only from the actual copy of the work owned, MP3.com can
take comfort in the knowledge that § 117 is read broadly. 2 Moreover,
63. 17 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994).
64. SeeMarobie-FL, 983 F. Supp. at 1178-79.
65. See Robertson, My.MP3.com Q & A, supra note 21.
66. See Bloom, supra note 30, at 185-86.
67. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518-19 (9th Cir. 1993).
68. See Stenograph L.L.C. v. Bossard Assocs., Inc., 144 F.3d 96, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(finding installations of software onto a computer constitutes "copying" under the Copyright
Act); MAI Sys., 991 F.2d at 518-19 (finding copies of computer software made in RAM are
"fixed" and qualify as a copy under the Copyright Act); see also 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra
note 45, § 8.08(A)(1), at 8-115 to 8-116. Note although mp3 files are music and thus
"phonorecords," the term "copy" will be used throughout this Article. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994 &
Supp. IV 1999).
69. 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999); see also 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra
note 45, § 8.08(B)(1), at 8-19 to 8-120.
70. See § 1 17(a)(1); see also Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 793 (5th
Cir. 1999).
71. See Robertson, My MP3.com Q&A, supra note 21.
72. See DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 359, 362
(E.D. Va. 1997) (stating the trend is to interpret § 117 broadly), rev'd in part, 170 F.3d. 1354
(Fed. Cir. 1999); see also 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 45, § 8.08(B)(1); see 2 NIMMER &
UMG RECORDINGS, INC. V. MP3. COM, INC.
73MP3.com may argue a streamed work is never complete in RAM. 3
Although incomplete, a portion of a work that is directly copied could still
infringe, unless it is so small a portion that it is de minimis. 74 Even though
the de minimis threshold is quite low, 75 the "buffering process ' 76 presents a
complication to MP3.com's potential argument. Buffering occurs when the
computer delays playing the work until a certain amount is received." This
eliminates pauses caused by slow delivery of the remaining data.78 When a
work is buffered, a large portion is potentially in the computer's RAM at
any given time, and thus more likely a copy for purposes of the Copyright
Act. 79  A RAM copy in this case is not de minimis, thus, this argument
could fail.
Moreover, a policy question remains whether RAM copies are
"copies" for purposes of the Copyright Act. Given that RAM copies are
only reusable by the most sophisticated user, why deem these copies as
capable of violating copyright? Making such copies illegal does nothing to
further the policies of the Copyright Act.8 ° If a copy is not useful, it should
not be labeled a copy. It cannot possibly detract from the market share of
an author, be used to create other works, or even be used to destroy the
author's good name and reputation.8' Recent trends suggest in the future,
RAM copies will not be considered "copies" for the purposes of an
NIMMER, supra note 69, §§ 8.08 n.1, 8.08(E) & n.71 (adding § 117 of the Copyright Act was
applicable to any copyrightable work even prior to the 1980 amendments and asserting § 117
applies to all digital copyrightable works, not just computer programs).
73. See generally RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., No. C99-2070P, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1889, at *3-4 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000).
74. See 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 45, § 8.01(G), at 8-24.
75. Warner Bros. Inc. v. Dae Rim Trading, Inc., 877 F.2d 1120, 1122, 1126 (2d Cir. 1989)
(ruling trafficking in twelve plastic dolls was infringement); see also 2 NIMMER & NIMMER,
supra note 69, § 8.01(G).
76. Buffering is "the process by which streaming audio and video saves data in advance of
playing it. Programs such as RealPlayer or Windows Media Player will download a part of the
... audio stream before starting to play, then continue the downloading as the stream plays. If the
playing catches up to the end of the buffer, the stream will pause while further buffering occurs."
MP3util, available at http://newmp3.com/mp3util/glossary.shtml (last visited Nov. 2, 2000).
77. Id.
78. http://www.3com.com/solutions/convergence/defined/conv-apps vsl.html (last visited
Feb. 26, 2000).
79. Id.
80. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power to create copyright protection
in order to "promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.").
81. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(A) (1994). The Copyright Act grants the copyright holder the right
"to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that work which would
be prejudicial to his honor or reputation." Id.
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infringement analysis.82  Section 115 of the Copyright Act assumes there
can be a real-time transmission, perhaps streaming, in which, "no
reproduction... is made... in order to make the sound recording
audible. 83 Additionally, in a House Conference Report on the adoption of
§ 114, representatives asserted "streaming" technology allows the
transmission of data without the creation of a copy by the user.
84
Users may, of course, save music by making analog copies of the
files. This is easily accomplished by attaching a recording device to the
computer's audio output, or by making digital copies of the files by routing
the computer's audio-out jack to its own audio-in jack.85 However, this use
of MP3.com's product will not necessarily condemn MP3.com to liability
if any possible use of My.MP3.com is considered "substantially non-
infringing. 8 6
2. Is Such a Copy Fair Use?
If use of the work is not infringing, MP3.com will not be subject to
third party liability.87 An exception to copyright infringement is § 107 of
the Copyright Act. Commonly known as "fair use," this exception was
intended to give immunity to those who use a work for such purposes as
education, news reporting and criticism.
88
Courts must consider four factors, none of which is dispositive, in
determining whether a particular use is fair use.89 The first factor is "the
purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
82. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072,
1075-76 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (stating computer hard drives are outside the definition of digital music
recordings for purposes of the Copyright Act).
83. 17 U.S.C. § 115(d) (1994 & Supp. 1V 1999); see also Neil J. Rosini & Howard M.
Singer, Music and the Internet, in REPRESENTING THE NEW MEDIA COMPANY 1999, at 865, 882
(PLI Intellectual Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. G-545, 1999) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 115(d)
(Supp. IV 1999)).
84. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-796, at 83 (1998); see also Symposium, Musical Works
Performance and the Internet: A Discorance [sic] of Old and New Copyright Rules, 6 RICH. J.L.
& TECH. 3, 58 (1999).
85. Michael Robertson, Can Music Be Secure?, MP3.com (Oct. 26, 1998), at
http://www.mp3.com/news/1 15.html [hereinafter Roberston, Can Music Be Secure?].
86. See discussion infra Part V.A.2.
87. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Maphia, 948 F. Supp. 923, 934 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (stating
contributory infringement requires a finding of direct infringement); see also Kevin Davis,
Comment, Fair Use on the Internet: A Fine Line Between Fair and Foul, 34 U.S.F. L. REv. 129,
153-54 (1999).
88. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994); see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65-50 (1976).
89. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 45, § 13.05.
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commercial nature." 90 An examination of commercial use considers the
defendant's economic gain stemming from the unauthorized use of the
copyrighted work.9' The second factor is the nature of the copyrighted
work. 92 This factor depends on whether the work is factual or fictional;
factual works receive less protection.93 The third factor concerns the
amount of work used in relation to the size of the entire work.94 Even if the
entire work is copied, it may not preclude a finding of fair use.95 The
fourth factor is the effect of the use on the copyrighted work's potential
market.96 This factor encourages an examination of whether the use will
create a market substitute for the original work, not just whether it destroys
demand for the original.97 Courts are expected to balance the public benefit
gained from the use against the gain realized by the copyright owner if fair
use is denied.98 The medium in which the work is presented is irrelevant if
both the original and the copy serve the same function. 99
Applying the four factors to a My.MP3.com member's use of mp3
files results in a stalemate. Because the work is not factual and the entire
work is used, two factors seem to indicate the use is not fair. But because
the use of the work is non-commercial,100 and because the member must
possess or purchase a physical copy of the work,'01 the potential market for
the work is not harmed; these two factors indicate the use is fair.
90. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1994).
91. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 45, § 13.05(A)(1)(c), at 13-161 to 13-167.
92. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (1994).
93. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985) (citing
Robert A. Gorman, Fact or Fancy? The Implications for Copyright, 29 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y
560, 561 (1982) (explaining there is a greater need to disseminate factual information than works
of fiction)).
94. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1994).
95. Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 109 (2d Cir. 1998); see also 4
NIMMER'& NIMMER, supra note 45, § 13.05(A)(3), at 13-180 to 13-181.
96. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1994).
97. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 45, § 13.05(A)(4).
98. MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 183 (2d Cir. 1981) (citing Williams & Wilkins Co.
v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1352 (Ct. CI. 1973) and Berlin v. E.C. Publ'ns, Inc., 329 F.2d
541, 543-44 (2d Cir. 1964)); see also, 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 45, § 13.05(A)(4), at
13-181.
99. See MGM, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prods. Inc., 479 F. Supp. 351, 361 (N.D. Ga.
1979) (finding infringement where the purpose of the use was for competition between two
textbooks); Meredith Corp. v. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 686, 690 (S.D.N.Y.
1974); see also 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 45, § 13.05(B)(1), at 13-192 to 13-193.
100. Supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
101. Robertson, My.MP3.com Q &A, supra note 21.
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The Supreme Court's decision in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal
City Studios, Inc.'0 2 suggests the stalemate be resolved in favor of
MP3.com.'1 3  In Sony, the Court addressed the issue of home
videotaping. 10 4 By 1983, the video cassette recorder was virtually standard
in American homes. 0 5  Copyright owners of television programs were
concerned that by recording programs on videotape, viewers were creating
copies capable of infringing rights, such as the distribution right. 0 6 The
plaintiff sued Sony, the VCR manufacturer, on a theory of contributory
liability. 0 7 Sony defended on the ground that there were no predicate acts
of infringement by its users because the copying amounted to fair use.10 8
The fair use argued by Sony and accepted by the court was the
concept of "time-shifting."' 0 9 This term describes the taping of a broadcast
show for the purpose of watching it at a later time.' 10 The court ruled time-
shifting, even of non-consenting producers' programs, falls within the
statutory exception of fair use."' Although entire programs were copied,
the court reasoned because the initial broadcasts were free, such copying
could qualify as fair use. 1 2 Thus, the third fair use factor did not weigh
against Sony." 3 Additionally, because the plaintiffs were unable to prove
that time-shifting would hurt the market for either new programming or
reruns, the fourth fair use factor was not held against Sony either."
4
Furthermore, time-shifting is primarily noncommercial and for private use
in the home, facts that act as a thumb on the fair use scale in favor of Sony
and home users. 5  Therefore, even though the user might infringe a
copyright with the aid of a VCR, Sony was not liable.
102. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
103,Id. at 419-20.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 420.
106. Id. at 436.
107. Id.
108. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455-56 (1984).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 421.
111. Id. at 454-55 (the district court's findings aided the Supreme Court in concluding time-
shifting is fair use).
112. Id. at 455.
113. Id. at 449-50 (finding the copying of free television broadcasts in their entirety did not
preclude a finding of fair use).
114. Sony, 464 U.S. at 456 (holding respondents failed to show time-shifting would cause
non-minimal harm to the market for the works).
115. Id. at 449 (explaining the first fair use factor requires weighing the commercial or
nonprofit character of the use).
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Similarly, in UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 116 MP3.com
argued its technology enables the user to "space-shift," listening from a
home stereo to any computer with an Internet connection and speakers.1
17
This argument was first made in Recording Industry Ass 'n of America v.
Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc. 118 where the makers of a device
capable of storing and playing mp3 files asserted its player simply allowed
portability of mp3 files, thereby not affecting the infringement status of any
given mp3 file.' 1 9 The court accepted Diamond's argument, looking to
Sony's time-shifting rationale.
120
MP3.com could support its space-shifting claim by noting that even if
the copyright owners in some works object to this shifting, the use is fair
because users put the works to noncommercial, nonprofit, private use.
Although users might potentially create libraries of mp3 files for repeated
listening, the legitimate fair use of space-shifting would free MP3.com
from contributory liability.
However, a court may distinguish MP3.com's space-shifting
argument from Sony's time-shifting theory on the fair use factors.121 For
example, analysis of the first factor may differ because while broadcasting
is free to the user, Internet service generally is not. 122 Therefore, unlike the
time-shifter, the space-shifter recognizes economic gain. 23  Another
difference is that copies of sound recordings are almost always made for
the purpose of creating retention copies.' 24 This differs from the finding in
Sony that a great portion of television taping is done solely for time-shifting
p~PSS125
purposes.12
The comparison of the free nature of broadcasting to the cost of
Internet service may be erroneous. The comparison should instead be
drawn between free broadcasting and the cost to the user of listening to
116. 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
117. Id. at 351.
118. 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999).
119. Id. at 1079.
120. See id. (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 455 (holding "time-shifting" of copyrighted television
shows with VCRs constituted fair use under the Copyright Act)). Time-shifting is a type of
copying that is paradigmatic noncommercial personal use and is consistent with the purposes of
the Copyright Act. Id. To date, the legislature has refused to outlaw home taping. Perhaps this is
because: 1) no actual economic harm has been demonstrated; 2) enforcement problems exist; and
3) users feel entitled to, and are comfortable with, home taping. For the same reasons, the court
in Diamond may have refused to outlaw space-shifting. See Diamond, 180 F.3d 1072.
121. Bloom, supra note 30, at 188.
122. See id. at 188-89.
123. § 107(1).
124. See 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 45, § 8B.01(D) (2), at 8B-18 to 8B-19.
125. Sony, 464 U.S. at 421.
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music. Ostensibly, My.MP3.com members have already paid for physical
copies of the work. 126 To those users, each subsequent listen is free of
charge. 127 The similarity to free broadcasting makes the idea of space-
shifting more credible.
However, even a close fit between time-shifting and space-shifting
may sink MP3.com's argument, as both may actually fail the fair use test.
It has been suggested the analysis of the first fair use factor so persuaded
the Sony court that the court did not apply the other three factors at all.
128
Were the other three factors considered in Sony, they would have weighed
against the home tapers, just as they weigh against MP3.com users. The
nature of the work is overwhelmingly fictional, rather than factual. The
entire work is copied. Moreover, because a showing of economic harm
need only meet a preponderance of the evidence standard, 2 9 it is easily
shown in the MP3.com context. Users may theoretically cease to purchase
their own copies of the music,130 thus harming the market.
But this narrow view of the market does not take account of the
Internet as a new medium for which new methods of marketing must and
will be developed. A strong negative market effect might be an indication
only of inefficient market use, not piracy, particularly in the light of
MP3.com's attempt to require that every member pay for the music by
having purchased a physical copy. 131 MP3.com's effect on the market will
depend on: 1) the convenience of Internet access; 2) the ease of its
members to obtain physical copies of a work; and 3) the ease with which
users share an account, thus creating a music "library" of works which each
member has not paid for.
3. Is Such a Copy Covered under the AHRA?
A natural limitation on analog copying is that each successive copy
decays in quality, thus making each generation of copies less marketable. 
32
126. See Robertson, My.MP3.com Q & A, supra note 21.
127. Id.
128. See Bloom, supra note 30, at 189-90.
129. See id. at 190.
130. Although overall record sales have increased twelve percent since music became
widely available online, record stores near college campuses report drops in sales. E.g., Hillary
Davis, Local Record Sales Not Affected by Online Music Providers, ARIZONA DAILY WILDCAT
ONLINE (Sept. 7, 2000) (noting a four percent drop in sales at local record stores), at
http://wildcat.arizona.edu/papers/94/13/index.html.
131. See Robertson, My.MP3.com Q & A, supra note 21.
132. See Andrew R. Basile, Jr., Recent Developments: Intellectual Property Law and the
Internet, in 17th ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY & REGULATION 293,
318 (PLI Intellectual Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. G-584, 1999).
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Despite this limitation, pirated copies of music have cost the recording
industry billions of dollars since the invention of home recording
devices. 133 Because this limitation does not exist in digital copying, the
industry stands to lose much more. 134 Congress answered the industry's
concerns about digital copying in 1992 by enacting the AHRA.' 35 The
AHRA supports the economic component of copyright by requiring the
payment of a royalty to the artists and producers upon the sale of digital
recording machinery and media. 36 The AHRA also protects the copyright
owner's control over the work by mandating the use of a Serial Copy
Management System ("SCMS"), which allows the making of copies only
from originals.
137
The AHRA appears applicable to the My.MP3.com service. The mp3
files at issue are likely to fit the definition of "digital audio copied
recording" provided by the statute. 138  As preeminent copyright scholar
Melville B. Nimmer asserts, "to the extent that machinery is implicated
from which copies can be made, copying controls apply."'' 39 Furthermore,
royalties are generally assessed against objects used to make these digital
recordings; 140 the My.MP3.com service could be considered one such
object.
14 1
133. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072,
1073-74 (9th Cir. 1999). Industry studies indicate home taping costs the industry upwards of 700
million dollars annually, and that sales would increase by twenty percent if such taping were
eliminated. See 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 45, § 8B.0 I(D)(2), at 8B- 18 to 8B- 19.
134. The proliferation of digital audio tape recorders costs the recording industry about one-
third of its yearly sales due to unauthorized copying of music from CDs. Steven V. Podolsky,
Chasing the Future: Has the Digital Performance in Sound Recordings Act of 1995 Kept Pace
with Technological Advances in Musical Performance, or Is Copyright Law Lagging Behind?, 21
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 651, 670 (1999) (citing U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECH.
ASSESSMENT, COPYRIGHT, AND HOME COPYING, OTA-CIT-422, TECHNOLOGY CHALLENGES
THE LAW, 154 (1989)).
135. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-10 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
136. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1003-07 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
137. See 17 U.S.C. § 1002 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). SCMS prevents illegal production of
digital copies by placing a "copy bit" on a CD. Mitsui CDR-Store.com, at
http://www.mitsuicdrstore.com/SCMS_nh.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2000). The "copy bit"
places restrictions on copying and can prevent further copying. Id.
138. 17 U.S.C. § 1001(1) (1994) (defining a "digital audio copied recording" as "a
reproduction in a digital recording format of a digital musical recording, whether that
reproduction is made directly from another digital musical recording or indirectly from a
transmission").
139. 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 45, § 8B.03(A)(1), at 8B-42.
140. Id. § 8B.02(A)(4), at 8B-33.
141. It is unclear whether My.MP3.com falls under the third exemption to this royalty
requirement, a "digital audio interface device." See id. (discussing §§ 1001, 1003).
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If the AHRA does indeed apply to the My.MP3.com service, it has a
strange effect. It exempts MP3.com completely from all forms of third-
party liability by eliminating the possibility of a predicate act. Congress in
§ 1008142 has exempted consumers from liability for their noncommercial
use of "digital audio recording devices" or "digital audio recording
media."' 143  If mp3 programs and computers are digital audio recording
devices or digital audio recording media, consumers cannot be liable for
infringement. Thus, MP3.com cannot be liable as a third party.
Unfortunately, MP3.com then becomes vulnerable to direct liability
based on the AHRA's requirements of copy protection and royalty
payments. 44  If the My.MP3.com system is held subject to AHRA
requirements, MP3.com is potentially liable for not installing a copy
protection system similar to SCMS145 on its MP3 copies, as well as for
failing to collect royalties on the use of the program. 1
46
To escape direct liability, MP3.com may again look to Diamond. In
Diamond, the court held the definition of "digital musical recordings" does
not include computers because they are explicitly excluded as "material
objects... in which one or more computer programs are fixed.'
147
Therefore, MP3.com may assert music stored on a computer's hard drive
does not qualify as a "digital musical recording."' 148 The Diamond court
found support for this interpretation in the legislative history of the
AHRA. 149 It reasoned that although this exception meant "'[a]ny recording
device could evade [ ] regulation simply by passing the music through a
computer and ensuring that the MP3 file resided momentarily on the hard
drive...'[,] the Act seems to have been expressly designed to create this
142. 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). This is limited by § 115, enacted as part of
the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, in that remedies are available
for digital phonorecord deliveries, but the exemption for individuals who use the music
noncommercially stands. See 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 45, § 8B.07(C)(2), at 8B-89 to
8B-90.
143. See 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 45, § 8B.07(B)(2), at 8B-88. The exemption
includes the making of reproductions. See id.
144. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
145. See Richard D. Watkins, Rio Case Ok's Carnival of Music Copying, NAT'L L.J., Oct.
18, 1999, at B7. An analogous system is a type of file incorporating digital watermarks to control
their use on the Internet by non members. Id. Examples of systems using digital watermarking
technology include all file types compatible with the Secure Digital Music Initiative ("SDMI") or
MPEG-Advanced Audio Coding ("a2b"). Id.
146. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
147. 17 U.S.C. § 1001(5)(B) (1994); Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond
Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting § 1001(5)(B)).
148. § 1001(5)(B).
149. See Diamond, 180 F.3d at 1077 (citing S. REP. NO. 102-294 (1992)).
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loophole."' 50 Because computers are not "digital audio recording devices,"
they are not required to comply with the SCMS requirement." 5 ' All
MP3.com must do is remind the court that its own mp3 files are stored on a
hard drive. As a result, MP3.com would lose the automatic exemption
from third-party liability, but would escape liability for failure to pay
royalties or use analogous copy protection technology. 5 2  It could,
however, still evade third-party liability if its members' use does not
violate copyright law.
The RIAA has a single, albeit weak, argument against this settled law.
The RIAA must first prove MP3.com's storage hard drives are used solely
for mp3 files, and only contain programs used to play those files. Then, by
using an exception to an exception within the AHRA,' 53 the RIAA could
once again label MP3.com's files digital music recordings. The test to
determine what constitutes a digital recording device focuses on its
purpose. 154 If the "primary purpose" of the device is to produce digitally
copied recordings, it will qualify as a digital recording device.
155
MP3.com's servers could be characterized as having the primary purpose
of making these digital recordings. Moreover, the exception to digital
musical recordings does not apply to "statements or instructions ... used
directly or indirectly in order to bring about the perception, reproduction, or
communication of the fixed sounds."'1 56 By this account, MP3.com's hard
drives are nothing more than fancy CD players, and MP3.com's song files
are arguably infringing copies. Nonetheless, Diamond expressly says "any
copying from a computer hard drive" is included in the exemption to the
AHRA.
157
B. Contributory Infringement
Contributory infringement requires a predicate act, actual or
constructive knowledge of the infringement, and either "(i) personal
conduct that encourages or assists the infringement; or (ii) provision of
machinery or goods that facilitate the infringement." 158 Even if MP3.com's
150. Id. at 1078 (quoting Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc.,
29 F. Supp. 2d 624, 630).
151. Id.
152. See id. at 1078 (quoting Diamond, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 630).
153. See § 1001.
154. Diamond, 180 F.3d at 1078.
155. Id.
156. § 1001(5)(B).
157. Diamond, 180 F.3d at 1078.
158. Matthew Bender & Co. v. W. Publ'g Co., 158 F.3d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1998).
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conduct meets these requirements, it can still fight the element of providing
infringement facilitating equipment on the grounds that its product is
capable of substantial noninfringing uses.
1. The Innocent Infringer
MP3.com can escape liability for contributory copyright infringement
if it demonstrates it did not know of its users' infringing uses.
159
Knowledge exists when the operator knows or has reason to know
infringing activities are occurring.' MP3.com can possibly assert the
affirmative defense of the "innocent infringer.' 6' This defense is available
to defendants against charges of contributory infringement, but not for
direct or vicarious infringement because direct and vicarious infringement
are governed by strict liability and require no particular state of mind.
1 62
MP3.com may argue it is an innocent infringer because it had no
actual knowledge of infringement by its users. However, the problem of
constructive knowledge looms large.
2. Inducement
To defend against the allegation of constructive knowledge indicating
contributory infringement, MP3.com must argue that its conduct does not
fit either of the two scenarios suggested by the Second Circuit. 63 The first
scenario, personal conduct that encourages or assists the infringement,
otherwise known as inducement,164 is difficult'to prove. A court could
foreseeably hold MP3.com encouraged the infringement by advertising its
My.MP3.com service to its regular MP3.com users, and assisted the
infringement by posting the MP3 files.
In response, MP3.com may argue it could not possibly encourage and
assist infringement if the users' actions themselves were not infringement.
Furthermore, it could not encourage and assist the infringement if it did not
know such acts constituted infringement in the first place. This argument
encompasses the other elements of a predicate infringing act and actual or
constructive knowledge.' 65 If the users' actions were in fact infringement,
159. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
160. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Maphia, 948 F. Supp. 923, 933 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
161. Id.
162. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 45, § 13.08, at 13-280.
163. See Matthew Bender, 158 F.3d at 706 (describing the inducement and equipment
provisions as two types of activities triggering contributory liability).
164. Id.
165. See discussion supra Part V.
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and MP3.com knew of such use, then its advertising and posting likely
encouraged the infringement.
Although the RIAA's lawsuit certainly provided constructive
knowledge of infringing activities, 66 MP3.com may defend on the ground
that the law in this area is unsettled.167 Thus, MP3.com may avoid liability
stemming from its failure to remove the infringing material following
notification from the RIAA. MP3.com could even argue because the
legality of its actions is unresolved under current law, it did not have any
knowledge of infringement either before or after notification.
Despite the immorality of an actor, courts should not hold individuals
or companies liable for capitalizing on gaps or lack of clarity in the law.
Predictability is an essential part of a well constructed rule of law, and
legislators have a duty to provide guidance to facilitate interpretation.
However, in reality, it is rare a party participating in a harmful action does
not possess at least some knowledge indicating the illegality of that action.
For example, the RIAA may argue MP3.com had constructive
knowledge of infringement because the Copyright Act explicitly states a
copy in a computer's RAM is considered a "copy" under the Act. 168 Even
if the law is unclear on whether a copy is infringing, MP3.com can be
imputed with the fundamental knowledge that a copy is made in the
RAM.
69
In its defense, MP3.com may point to the uncertainty surrounding
whether streaming.creates a complete copy in the RAM. 170 Nevertheless,
the RIAA still has a strong infringement argument that MP3.com had
constructive knowledge-it was aware its users may create analog or
digital copies of the streamed MP3 files.17
3. Infringement-Facilitating Equipment
MP3.com could experience further difficulty escaping charges of
contributory infringement under the infringement-facilitating equipment
166. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072,
1076 (9th Cir. 1999).
167. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1374 (N.D. Cal. 1995). The court held, where a BBS operator could not verify the claim of
infringement, the operator was not liable for contributory infringement for refusing to "take
down" the infringing material, and it did not matter whether the lack of verification was due to
the unresolved legality of the actions. Id.
168. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
169. See discussion supra Part V.A. 1.
170. See discussion supra Part V.A. 1.
171. See Robertson, Can Music Be Secure?, supra note 85 (admitting such copying
practices are possible with regard to My.MP3.com).
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theory of liability. I7 2  MP3.com provides equipment in the form of its
My.MP3.com service, which facilitates the alleged infringing use. Case
law establishes simply providing equipment will not confer liability if the
equipment is "capable of substantial non-infringing uses."'
73
In Sony, 174 the Court held Sony was not contributorily liable because
its equipment was "capable of substantial noninfringing uses," specifically
time-shifting. 75 Moreover, the Court did not place great weight on whether
users actually engaged the equipment in substantial noninfringing uses.1
76
In fact, it recognized some users put Sony Betamax VCRs to multiple
infringing uses, constructing libraries of tapes to watch repeatedly at their
leisure.' 77 The plaintiffs attempted to overcome the defendant's substantial
non-infringing use argument by asserting the infringing uses outweighed
the non-infringing uses. 178  However, the Sony court stated it need not
explore every possible use of the machine, or even determine what usage
level is "commercially significant"; it was enough to find that one potential
use of VCRs, time-shifting, did not infringe the copyrights. 179 It is true
some My.MP3.com members may put mp3s to infringing uses. Under
Sony, however, a court could ignore such infringement in determining
MP3.com's liability.180 Simply put, if MP3.com can show its equipment is
capable of noninfringing uses, even though some customers may use the
equipment to infringe on copyrights, the question of whether those users
have committed a predicate act of infringement becomes irrelevant.
However, this may prove difficult for MP3.com. Unlike in Sony
where some copyright owners supported time-shifting,' 8' few copyright
owners have come forth to support My.MP3.com's space-shifting
argument. The difference in clarity between analog and digital copies, and
the speed with which each can be copied and distributed, are also factors
weighing against MP3.com. Finally, the Sony court based its decision in
172. See Matthew Bender & Co. v. W. Publ'g Co., 158 F.3d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1998)
(quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984)).
173. Id. (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 442).
174. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See id. at 423 (stating some Sony Betamax VCR owners used the equipment to record
and collect libraries of tapes, presumably for the purpose of watching shows more than once or
showing them to friends and family).
178. Id. at 444.
179. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
180. See id.
181. Id. at 445 (quoting Fred Rogers' testimony that, because some broadcasters air such
shows at inconvenient times, families should be allowed to time-shift educational programming).
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part on the fact that the taped broadcasts were free and not chosen on-
demand by the user. 8 2 In contrast, MP3.com's users choose when and
which mp3 files to listen to, even though not all files were available to
listeners free of charge at all times. 
8 3
C. Vicarious Liability
MP3.com may also find itself vulnerable to a vicarious liability claim.
To prevail against MP3.com, a plaintiff would have to prove: 1) a
predicate act by the user; 2) MP3.com controls its members' usage of the
mp3 files; and 3) MP3.com directly profits from the users' infringement.
While MP3.com would claim it neither supervises nor directly profits
from its members' usage of the My.MP3.com service, and should not be
forced to pay for damages it does not directly cause, MP3.com does
supervise the use of its mp3 files in a very basic way. Unlike in Sony,
where Sony only controlled its users equipment at the point of sale,1
8 4
MP3.com maintains continuous control over its users by posting all of the
mp3 files available on the site. 85 MP3.com can terminate users' access to
equipment at any time, and prevent further use by either suspending
membership or shutting down the My.MP3.com service entirely.1
8 6
Even assuming the users' infringement, the question of whether
MP3.com directly profits from its activities is not easily answered.
18 7
MP3.com cannot dispute that free access to popular and commercially
available music through its My.MP3.com service enhances its
attractiveness to members and encourages non-members to join. 88 Still,
MP3.com does not charge its users for the My.MP3.com service, so it does
not receive a direct economic benefit from its users.
182. Id. at 456.
183. Often, only a few songs on any given album get radio airplay. However, once
My.MP3.com offers access to an album, members have access not only to songs receiving
airplay, but to all songs on that album.
184. Sony, 464 U.S. at 438.
185. My.MP3.com Account and Related Services, at www.mp3.com/my/terms/index.html
(last visited Nov. 8, 2000).
186. Id.
187. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communications Servs., Inc., 907 F.
Supp. 1361, 1376-77 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding access providers who charge only a fixed fee for
use of a computer bulletin board service do not receive direct benefit from infringing postings so
long as those postings do not enhance the value of the services or attract new subscribers).
188. Some courts have rejected similar theories of "direct financial benefit." Id. at 1377;
see also Jennifer E. Markiewicz, Comment, Seeking Shelter from the MP3 Storm: How Far Does
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act Online Service Provider Liability Limitation Reach?, 7
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 423, 433 (1999).
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In the Ninth Circuit, proof of control and direct profit are not
necessary to support a finding of vicarious liability.1 89 In Fonovisa, Inc. v.
Cherry Auction, Inc.,' 90 the court held despite the lack of supervision and
direct profit, third party liability can attach where "infringing performances
enhance the attractiveness of the venue to potential customers."' 19  The
irony in the case of MP3.com is that its customers are not its members, but
rather, its advertisers.
192
MP3.com profits by allowing advertisers to rent space on its site.
93
Although the rent advertisers pay is not directly tied to the number of
MP3.com visitors, it is indirectly linked; as MP3.com becomes more
popular, the market will sustain higher rents for its advertising space.
Accordingly, MP3.com is likely vicariously liable for infringement through
its My.MP3.com service, at least in the Ninth Circuit, because its users'
infringing acts entice more users to join, thus enhancing the attractiveness
of the website to MP3.com's customers, its advertisers.
VI. INFRINGEMENT OF THE REPRODUCTION RIGHT
Section 106(1) of the Copyright Act states a copyright owner has the
exclusive right "to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or
phonorecords."'' 94  An infringer violates the right of reproduction by
creating a copy of the work.195 To be a copy, 196 the work must be fixed in a
material object "from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or a
device."'
' 97
The copies at issue here are the mp3 files MP3.com creates from
legally purchased reproductions. Ordinarily, a plaintiff proves copying by
189. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
190. Id.
191. Id. But see, Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503, 514
(N.D. Ohio 1997) (indicating the Fonovisa court erroneously applied vicarious liability factors in
determining contributory infringement).
192. Mark Solomons, Survey - FT Creative Business: Dancing In the Dark, FIN. TIMES
(LONDON), Oct. 17, 2000, at 12 (stating MP3.com derives ninety percent of its revenues from
advertising).
193. Id.
194. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1994).
195. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476 (1976).
196. Technically, these copies are called "phonorecords" because they are composed of
sounds; however, the term "copy" will be used throughout this paper. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994
& Supp. IV 1999).
197. Id.; see also Matthew Bender & Co. v. W. Publ'g Co., 158 F.3d 693, 702 (2d Cir.
1998) (defining a "copy").
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submitting direct evidence, or by demonstrating: 1) the defendant had
access to the original work and the copied work is substantially similar or
2) a striking similarity exists that obviates the need to show access. 198 Here
MP3.com concedes it literally copied or reproduced the works from
commercially available CDs to its own hard drive space.' 99  Thus,
MP3.com has the burden to show that although its files are copies, they do
not infringe the reproduction right. It can do this only by demonstrating it
has permission to copy the works or by invoking an exception to the
copyright law.200 MP3.com admits it did not seek permission to make these
copies °.20  Thus, it is forced to look to fair use, the broadest infringement
exception.
20 2
MP3.com claims because its use of the work is noncommercial and its
members already own personal copies of the music, it meets the fair use
criteria.0 3 However, the purpose of the exception is to allow incidental use
or to promote scholarly study of a work.20 4 Application of the fair use
factors here demonstrates this purpose is not met by MP3.com. As the
court concluded in UMG Recordings, MP3.com's use of the works fails to
qualify as fair and violates the reproduction rights of the copyright owners
in sound recordings.20 5 The application of the first factor, the use of the
material,20 6 does not favor MP3.com. While MP3.com does not directly
profit from its members' use, it does profit from banner advertising. 207 It
also profits in the sense that the vast library of files available on the
My.MP3.com service attract a wide and growing audience. 208 This indirect
profit weighs against MP3.com.
198. Langman Fabrics v. Graff Califoriawear, Inc., 160 F.3d 106, 115 (2d Cir. 1998); Sid
& Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977); see
also 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 45, § 13.01(B), at 13-8 to 13-14.
199. See Lewis, supra note 19.
200. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(3)(C) (Supp. 1V 1999); see also Bloom, supra note 30, at 203.
201. See Complaint, 1, MPL Communications, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., (S.D.N.Y. filed on
Mar. 21, 2000) (No. 00 CIV. 1979), available at http://www.mp3.com/news/672.html.
202. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d
349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding MP3.com's actions did not qualify as fair use).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See discussion supra Part III.
206. See discussion supra Part III.
207. See Solomons, supra note 192.
208. See David Segal, Recording Giant Wins Ruling over Web Site; Copyright Fine...
WASH. POST., Sept. 7, 2000, at A8 (stating MP3.com's original business model hosted obscure
and unknown bands, but has since expanded into My.MP3.com, allowing users to listen to well
known artists such as Madonna and Pearl Jam. The company bought thousands of CDs, made
copies and stored them on servers.).
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The second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work,20 9 also weighs
against MP3.com. 210 Musical works are not factual, thus there is no policy-
based need to loosen the hold of the copyright owner in order to
disseminate knowledge. Similarly, the third factor weighs against
MP3.com as well. MP3.com makes entire albums available on its site.
However, use of the entire work does not necessarily mean the use is
unfair.
211
The fourth factor concerns whether the use might affect the value or
potential market of the work.21 2 MP3.com attempts to avoid affecting the
market for the copyrighted work by restricting the use of its service to
members who purchase a physical copy of the CD.21 3 These restrictions,
however, cannot serve as a defense against copyright infringement.
21 4
Even though users do not download copies of the mp3 files, they may still
affect the market by listening to streamed files.215 Although it is not easy to
make retention copies of streamed files, streaming allows users to listen to
the music anywhere, at any time, via a computer with an Internet
216connection. Virtually no difference exists between a retention copy
downloaded on one's personal computer and the always-accessible copy
kept by MP3.com on its server.2t7
VII. INFRINGEMENT OF THE DISTRIBUTION RIGHT
Section 106(3) of the Copyright Act grants a distribution right by
giving the owner the exclusive right to "distribute copies or phonorecords
of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of
ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending. ' '218 MP3.com does not sell, rent,
or lease the works available on its site. However, its delivery of music to
users may be considered a lending of the works, or even a transfer of
ownership if the user saves a digital copy of the streamed content.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 425-26 (1984)
(holding copying of an entire work can still constitute fair use whenever "there is no
accompanying reduction in the market for plaintiff's original work").
212. See § 107.
213. Robertson, My.MP3.com Q & A, supra note 21.
214. Microsoft Corp. v. Harmony Computers & Elecs., Inc., 846 F. Supp. 208, 211
(E.D.N.Y. 1994).
215. Robertson, My.MP3.com Q & A, supra note 21.
216. Id.
217. See discussion supra Part V.A.2.
218. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1994).
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Additionally, distribution requires copies to reach the public forum.
2 19
Thus, if streaming does not create copies at the point of use, the copyright
is not violated.22 °
A. Is This a True Distribution of the Work?
A distribution under the Copyright Act is complete only when users
obtain copies of the work from the defendant.221 Furthermore, distribution
implies a copy is passed from the defendant to the users, such that the
defendant no longer has use of the copy.
To defend on a claim of violation of the distribution right, MP3.com
would assert streaming audio does not create a copy on the user's
computer, and argue because the user never receives a "copy" of the work
from MP3.com, there is no distribution. However, the question of whether
streaming audio creates a copy is unsettled.222 If a court holds users do
obtain a copy of the work, MP3.com may attempt to argue that because it
retains the original mp3 files even after members have listened, there has
been no true distribution.223
This second argument hinges on the meaning of "distribution." Past
technologies required the making and distributing of a copy at separate
times. The My.MP3.com service has the potential to allow creation and
distribution of copies simultaneously. Both the reproduction and the
distribution rights are involved in streaming technology. 224  MP3.com's
members arguably make RAM copies of its mp3 files; hence, there is a
reproduction. For this reproduction, the user may be directly liable, and
MP3.com may be liable as a third party. But MP3.com is, in a sense, also
distributing the works by providing technology and a forum through which
many copies are disseminated.225 Thus, MP3.com may be liable for both a
219. See Complaint, 13, MPL Communications, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. filed on
Mar. 21, 2000) (No. 00 CIV 1979), available at http://www.mp3.com/news/672.html.
220. See supra Part V.A. 1.
221. § 106(3).
222. See discussion supra Part V.A.I.
223. See discussion supra Part II.
224. See Symposium, supra note 84, at 38 (citing H.R. REP. No. 105-796, at 83 (1998)
(describing how the rights protected by copyright merge when considered in the context of the
Internet)).
225. One argument supporting distribution is that different users can listen to identical songs
simultaneously. While this happens every day in the medium of radio, radio broadcasts differ
from MP3.com's brand of streaming, in which the user selects which song to hear and when, as if
the user had a personal copy. The policy behind protecting against distribution of copies applies
perfectly to the situation created by the My.MP3.com service. Thus, even in the absence of actual
copies, MP3.com should be liable for violation of the distribution right.
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reproduction and a distribution violation with every member's use. For this
reason, MP3.com may argue its liability should be limited to only one
copyright violation for each user's listen, rather than two, and that this new
technological development should be excluded from the definition of
"distribution."
This argument will fail. There is no legal or policy-based reason
MP3.com should escape double liability. One of the two liabilities is based
on rules of third party liability; the other stems from MP3.com's original
choice to post the works along with the technology to distribute them.
MP3.com must accept the consequences of its use of technology.
B. Is MP3.com Distributing the Works Publicly?
Infringement of the distribution right requires dissemination of copies
or phonographs of the copyrighted work to the public.226 MP3.com could
argue it does not violate the public component of the distribution right
because it is the users who actively choose which files to hear, not
MP3.com distributing files to the public. Some courts subscribe to this
reasoning.227  The Second Circuit, however, has rejected this argument
when certain elements are present. 8
In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc.,229 the court
examined distributions by website owners whose files were disseminated
only upon affirmative request by the users.230 The court distinguished the
case before it on two facts.231  First, the defendant had a policy of
encouraging subscribers to upload all types of files without discriminating
between infringing and non-infringing files.232  Second, despite the
defendant's policy of screening all uploads,233 infringing works were
occasionally posted to the bulletin board.234 The court held the defendant
company liable for direct copyright infringement because these affirmative
acts went beyond the behavior of the other defendants, which typically
226. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1994).
227. See e.g. Religious Tech.Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F.
Supp. 1361, 1372 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding the BBS's role was truly passive where the users
both uploaded and downloaded infringing material with no assistance from the BBS other than
provision of the storage space).
228. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503, 512-13 (N.D.
Ohio 1997).
229. Id.
230. See id. at 511-12.
231. Id. at 513.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 506.
234. Playboy Enters., 982 F. Supp. at 513.
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consisted solely of providing the space within which infringing activities
occurred.235 Generally, any affirmative act beyond providing storage space
can serve as a violation of the distribution right on the grounds that such
distribution is to the "public. 236
MP3.com's actions appear more egregious than the actions of the
defendant in Russ Hardenburgh, Inc. Whereas there, the company merely
solicited uploads from users, MP3.com actually posted the protected works
on the site itself. 237 Additionally, MP3.com clearly intended to make the
music available to members of the public, as evidenced by its solicitation of
new members for its My.MP3.com service on the MP3.com homepage. 238
C. Does the First Sale Doctrine Immunize MP3.com from Infringement of
the Distribution Right?
Section 109 of the Copyright Act, commonly referred to as the "first
sale" doctrine, prevents the copyright holder from interfering with the
resale of a purchased copy by acknowledging the copyright owner's right
"to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy." 239 Because
MP3.com lawfully purchased the CDs from which it made its mp3 files,24°
MP3.com might look to the first sale doctrine to protect it from liability
based on distribution of mp3 files. However, the first sale doctrine will not
rescue MP3.com, for three reasons.
First, the first sale doctrine is a defense against infringement of the
distribution right, not the reproduction right. 241 MP3.com's CEO, Michael
Robertson, has suggested the first sale doctrine protects its creation of mp3
files from lawfully purchased CDs by giving it the right to do "whatever it
wants" with the copies it purchased.242 Unfortunately for MP3.com, this
argument is misplaced. Copying a work invokes the reproduction right,
235. Id. at 503,
236. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Pub'g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032, 1039
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that a website operator who invited users to download infringing
images was liable for infringement of the distribution right, although the users themselves chose
which images to download).
237. See Robertson, My.MP3.com Q & A, supra note 2 1.
238. www.mp3.com (last visited Nov. 17, 2000).
239. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1994); see also Microsoft Corp. v. Harmony Computers &
Elecs., Inc., 846 F. Supp. 208, 212 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (referencing § 109(a) of title 17 of the United
States Code as "the first sale doctrine").
240. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
241. See § 109(a).
242. See Lewis, supra note 19.
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even when copied into a different medium; 243 the first sale doctrine simply
does not apply.
Second, the first sale doctrine demands the lawful making or
acquisition of resold copies.244 MP3.com lawfully purchased the CDs it
used to make its mp3 files,245 but those mp3 files arguably infringe on the
reproduction right of the copyright holders.2 46 Moreover, if users are held
as making their own copies of the mp3 files, in RAM or otherwise, those
copies may also illegally infringe. 247 No matter which mp3 file is deemed
the distributed copy, the first sale doctrine will not apply.
However, a statutory exception to the first sale doctrine may apply to
the My.MP3.com service. Section 109(b)(1)(A) prohibits owners of copies
of phonorecords or computer programs from "disposing of.. .the
possession of that phonorecord or computer program (including any tape,
disk, or other medium embodying such program)" by any "act or practice
in the nature of rental, lease, or lending" without authorization.24' While
niP3 files are not phonorecords or computer programs, they are a hybrid of
the two, and thus may fall under this exception to the first sale doctrine.
Because MP3.com's use of mp3 files is similar to lending,249 this exception
would prohibit MP3.com's continued propagation of its My.MP3.com
service.
Policy supports this outcome. The distribution right is intended to
protect the market for the author's work, ensuring for the author both
proper compensation and control of the markets the author hopes to
exploit.2 50 The exception, first sale, allows transfer of physical copies of
works after the artist has received fees for his contribution to the artistic
world.251 But only one person can enjoy a physical copy at a time. Any
secondary market created by the resale of used copies would not be formed
until after the artist has gotten paid, and would be small in comparison to
the sales of original physical copies. But digital distribution allows many
243. See Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 618 & n.12
(7th Cir. 1982); see also 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note, § 8.01(B), at 8-16.
244. See Microsoft, 846 F. Supp. at 212. That these copies are not "resold" is irrelevant to
the analysis.
245. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
246. See discussion supra Part VI.
247. See discussion supra Part V.A.
248. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(A) (1994). Section 117 extends this exception to the first sale
doctrine to include the lawfully made RAM copies of computer programs. See 17 U.S.C. § 117
(1994).
249. See discussion supra Part VII.
250. See 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1994).
251. See id.
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people to use a copy at the same time, a situation the first sale doctrine does
not contemplate. Digital distribution allows the audience, at the time of the
initial release of the work, to enjoy the work immediately, without having
to make the choice between paying full price for an original copy or
waiting until a copy becomes available on the secondary market. This
instant availability destroys the protection the distribution right intended to
preserve in a way the first sale doctrine does not.
VIII. INFRINGEMENT OF THE DIGITAL PERFORMANCE RIGHT
In response to the increasing transfer of sound files over the Internet,
the recording industry convinced Congress to pass the Digital
Performances of Sound Recordings Act of 1995.252 The Act includes both
§ 106(6), which protects the copyright owner's right to publicly perform
sound recordings "by means of a digital audio transmission,' 253 and § 114,
which authorizes compulsory licenses in sound recordings for providers
with non-interactive and non-announced playlists 4  Because MP3.com
runs an interactive service, it cannot obtain a compulsory license in sound
recordings. As a result, it remains governed by § 106(6), which requires
that before it publicly performs a work, it obtain voluntary permission from
the owner of the rights in the sound recording. 5  MP3.com did not obtain
such permission; 256 therefore, its only option is to prove it does not perform
works publicly.
There is little doubt mp3 files are "performed., 257  However, only
public performances infringe on § 106(6). Therefore, the question is
whether the performance is public. The answer depends on whom the court
decides is doing the performing. If the court holds MP3.com is performing
252. Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(6), 114
(1995), see also Jube Shriver, Jr., Digital Double Trouble: From Rap Music to Medical
Formulas, Little Seems Safe from Duplication, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1994, at Al (chronicling the
passage of the Digital Performance of Sound Recordings Act of 1995).
253. 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (Supp. IV 1999).
254. 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2) (Supp. IV 1999); see also GORMAN & GINSBURG, supra note
49, at 558.
255. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(3)(C) (Supp. IV 1999).
256. See Lewis, supra note 19.
257. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999) (stating to "perform a work means to
recite, render, play, dance, or act it, either directly or by means of any device or process").
Playing pre-recorded music can be a performance; the House Report explicitly states that a public
performance can be the first performance of a work, and "also any further act by which that
rendition or showing is transmitted or communicated to the public." H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at
64 (1976); see also GORMAN & GINSBURG, supra note 49, at 567. Broadcasting a work can be a
performance as well; the House Report indicates a broadcaster is performing whenever it
transmits a work, whether live or from a recording. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 64 (1976).
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these works, the audience is the public, and MP3.com will be liable for
infringement on the digital performance right. If the court holds individual
users do the performing, MP3.com will not be infringing because there is
no public audience.
There are two arguments that when MP3.com performs a work, it
does so publicly. The first relies on an analogy between MP3.com and a
radio station. Copyright law specifies members of the public need not be in
the same place, or hear a performance at the same time, for a performance
to be public under § 106(6).2"8 Drawing on this law, the Second Circuit
found members of a radio audience constitute the public even though they
received the performance in separate locations - their own homes.259
Similarly, MP3.com's members receive the performance in their own
homes, and thus constitute the public.260
The second argument that MP3.com's performance of works is public
is based on its use of the Internet. Copyright scholars tend to believe
posting a work on the Internet is automatically a public performance; no
proof of an actual audience is necessary.26' One reason for this is the ease
with which the public may access the work. Another reason is the possible
difficulty of proof that a specific group of people has accessed the work.
2 6 2
Conversely, if MP3.com's individual members are each performing
the work, there is no public audience, thus no public performance, and no
infringement of the digital performance right. Use of an mp3 file is almost
always private and experienced solely by the user. Unless the user calls in
a group of strangers, the audience does not fit the definition of public
provided in § 101 of the Copyright Act.263 Under this view, MP3.com is
258. § 101.
259. Assoc. Music Publishers, Inc. v. Debs Mem'l Radio Fund, Inc., 141 F.2d 852, 854 (2d
Cir. 1944); accord Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. Am. Auto. Accessories Co., 5 F.2d 411, 412 (6th
Cir. 1925).
260. MP3.com's limited membership does not save it from liability, because a performance
may still be public even though it is shown only to a limited number of subscribers. See Playboy
Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1557 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (drawing on Nimmer's
definition of a public audience as "a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of
family and its social acquaintances" in concluding that a limited group of subscribers is "public");
see also § 101 (defining "publicly" as "to perform or display [a work] at a place open to the
public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a
family and its social acquaintances is gathered").
261. See Bloom, supra note 30, at 195 (citing Jane C. Ginsburg, Putting Cars on the
"Information Superhighway ": Authors, Exploiters and Copyright in Cyberspace, 95 COLUM. L.
REv. 1466, 1480 (1995)).
262. Users may not wish to admit they used the work if this admission subjects them to
liability for infringing the reproduction right. See discussion supra Part V.A.
263. § 101.
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not liable for either direct or contributory infringement of the digital
performance right.
Regardless to whom the performance is attributed, the individual
users will escape liability for infringing on the public performance right.
To MP3.com, a court's decision about who is performing matters a great
deal. A finding that MP3.com is liable for infringing on the public
performance right, as well as the reproduction and distribution rights, will
increase punitive damage awards, as well as regular or statutory damages
and attorney's fees.264 MP3.com may again suggest applying the public
performance rights to its actions punishes it three times for one action, as
any performance to a My.MP3.com member also automatically violates the
reproduction and distribution rights.265 This argument seems strong,
particularly in light of a possible collapse of the different intellectual
property rights on the Internet.266 However, the distinction between the
public performance right and other rights is clear. As held in UMG
Recordings, Inc., MP3.com's creation of mp3 files violates the
reproduction right. Furthermore, MP3.com's posting of the files violates
the public performance right, and allowing its users to listen to the files
violates the distribution right. These separate actions of MP3.com virtually
guarantee liability.
IX. CONCLUSION
While it is evident MP3.com directly violates basic copyright laws
against reproduction, distribution and digital performance rights, other
music sharing programs may not be subject to such easy analysis. From a
policy standpoint, it is imperative that similar music-sharing programs are
modified in a way that conforms to current copyright laws. Although
member use of music may be fair use of copyrighted materials, the authors
of the Copyright Act never contemplated such effortless transferring of
copies via the Internet. Society cannot permit technology to outsmart the
law-it must adjust to allow copyright owners to retain economic and
artistic control over their works. The law must continue to ensure
copyright owners proper protection for their creations despite the state of
the copying art.
264. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
265. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 109 (1994); see discussion supra Part VII.A.
266. See Symposium, supra note 84, at 38 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 105-796, at 83 (1998)
(describing how the rights -protected by copyright merge when considered in the context of the
Internet)).
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